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I Introduction
In this paper we develop a model in which wages of new hires are not determined independently of those of ongoing employees. The implication is that if there is a reason for ongoing wages to be rigid, this may be transmitted to the wages of new hires if the …rm is hiring. Even if the …rm is laying o¤ workers, we shall see that its layo¤ policy also depends on this link.
The crucial assumption that we make is that …rms cannot commit to employment levels. That is, as with "at-will"contracting, they cannot commit not to layo¤ a worker. They can commit, however, to wage contracts, current and future. If the wage for new hires is below that of incumbents, the …rm will have an incentive to replace its incumbents if it can …nd suitable applicants. Anticipating this, workers will have a preference for a contract in which wages of future hires are never below their own wages, so that the …rm will have no incentive to attempt to replace them. It will turn out that …rms o¤er such contracts because the ex ante costs of hiring are lower by a su¢ cient amount to o¤set having to forgo the potential bene…t of a lower wage for new hires in some future states. That is, it will be optimal to satisfy a "no replacement constraint" that requires that the wage for new hires is never below that of incumbents.
We adapt the models of Menzio and Moen (2010) and Snell and Thomas (2010) , henceforth MM and ST respectively. In MM overlapping generations of two-period lived …rms interact with in…nitely lived workers, while in ST both …rms and workers are in…nitely lived.
1 A related argument has been used in the insider-outsider literature; see Gottfries and Sjostrom (2000) . 2 We simplify these models to a two-period version that is more tractable for our purposes, but the basic ideas are similar.
In adverse future states, because of the no replacement constraint, the …rm will trade-o¤ a desire to smooth the wages of workers in ongoing employment, with the bene…ts from cutting the wage for new entrants. Treated on their own merit, the latter would receive a lower wage, but this would take it below the optimal wage 1 MM's model concerns a frictional labour market; in ST however the context is of a perfectly competitive labour market, and we adapt the latter approach.
2 They allow for separation payments to workers (which we rule out) on the assumption that who instigates a separation is not contractible, but the fact of separation is. They show that under certain conditions optimal separation payments are zero however, because positive payments would encourage workers to leave when this is undesirable for the …rm.
2 to be paid to incumbents. The upshot is that there is a degree of downward wage rigidity. The opposite is not true however. In particularly good states there is no problem in paying a higher wage to new entrants than to incumbents, so the rigidity only operates in a downward direction.
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Because the wage for new entrants is allocative, the downwardly rigid wage a¤ects hiring, and increases the variability of both unemployment and vacancies in response to productivity shocks, a point made also by MM and ST.
Apart from providing an alternative, tractable, version of MM and ST which captures a similar mechanism, 4 we believe that the model furnishes a number of new insights. One feature of our equilibrium which is a direct implication of the idea of equal treatment (i.e., when new hire and incumbent wages are tied together) but which we believe has not been formally analyzed before is that the downward pressure on wages exerted by negative shocks may diminish as shocks worsen. The idea is that once the no replacement constraint prevents wages from falling as far as they can, further negative shocks reduce the number of new hires, thus diminishing the bene…ts from wage cuts relative to the bene…ts of o¤ering stable wages to incumbent workers.
A second implication arises from the fact we consider situations where …rms are not hiring, which were not considered in MM and ST.
5 For a range of bad shocks, we …nd a zone of inactivity. At the point at which hiring falls to zero, wages of incumbents are perfectly smoothed (by the logic of the previous paragraph); this has the implication that the wage is above what incumbents might get if they are laid o¤. In slightly more adverse states, introducing layo¤s would lead to a discrete drop in incumbents'utility should they be laid o¤, and from an ex ante perspective it will be preferable to cut the wages of incumbents. Thus wages fall but employment is unresponsive as shocks worsen over this range. We argue that recent experience in the U.K. is consistent with this.
Both of these results suggest a very non-linear response of real wages to the 3 We shall assume that it is costly or infeasible for workers who quit in the second period to …nd work; this implies that the …rm does not have to respond to spot wages being above incumbent contract wages by raising the incumbent wage. ST allow for ex post worker mobility of the type assumed in (Beaudry and DiNardo 1991) , which implies that wages rise to match outside options. 4 For example, MM are only able to numerically analyse a case where transitions between states have zero probability. 5 To solve their model, ST have to impose conditions that imply that hiring is always positive.
3 state of the economy. When output is expanding wages are fully ‡exible upwards. In recessions real wages fall at …rst with no employment e¤ects, but for more severe shocks wages are not only downward rigid but actually may rise relative to some less severe shocks. This leads to a potentially large employment response, larger than would occur in a …rst-best outcome (trivially so, as the latter involves full employment at a …xed labour supply). Beyond some point, however, wages will fall sharply again as …rms seek to avoid layo¤s.
When layo¤s do occur they are involuntary (laid-o¤ workers su¤er a discrete drop in utility) and ine¢ cient in that employment is below …rst-best levels. The fact that layo¤s occur and are ine¢ cient is perhaps surprising in view of the fact that information is symmetric and wages are contingent. 6 The assumption of at-will employment contracting-that the …rm can decide on employment levels-is responsible for this outcome in two ways. It implies that the …rm can only prevent layo¤s by cutting the wage, since it cannot commit to avoid layo¤s. This creates a trade-o¤ between trying to smooth wages and trying to reduce layo¤s, the outcome of which is a wage below the level in the previous period, but one which is insensitive to shocks in this range. Secondly, even over this range, the motive not to replace incumbents prevents …rms from bringing in cheaper workers from outside, something that would be ex ante pro…table if …rms were able to commit not to replace incumbents.
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We argue that there is evidence that wages of new hires are not determined independently of those already employed in a …rm. This point has been made for example by Bewley (1999) who has argued that internal equity considerations prevent new hires from being paid a wage below that paid to incumbents. 8 Gertler 6 Thus the sort of mechanism underlying such layo¤s is not the same as appealing to predetermined wages which do not respond to productivity or other shocks, as in Hall and Lazear (1984) , for example. 7 Schmieder and von Wachter (2010) present the intriguing …nding that workers who have received wage increases due to tight past labor market conditions, as in Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) , face a higher risk of layo¤. As they state, theirs is the …rst study "to provide direct evidence that downward wage rigidities-in the form of persistent e¤ects of past favorable unemployment conditions on wages-lead to higher incidence of job displacement" [p.3] . This seems broadly consistent with the at-will contracting assumption that …rms do not make employment commitments, but choose employment optimally given the wage, and suggests that downward rigidity is playing an important role in layo¤s. It however leaves open the question of why …rms are not able to cut the wages of such workers. 8 According to Bewley (1999, p.477) : "Downward rigidity of the pay of new hires derives from that of existing employees, because all pay rates within a …rm are tied together. Reduced hiring pay 4 and Trigari (2009) also argue that wages of new hires do not appear to respond more to business cycle ‡uctuations than those of ongoing employees. 9 We return to this question at the end of Section II.
An outline of the paper is as follows. We start by laying out the main assumptions of the model. We then consider the case where …rms are hiring. We establish a degree of downward rigidity. Next, we consider the case where …rms are neither hiring nor …ring and show that …rms cut wages to hold employment constant. We then consider an example and analyze layo¤ policy. Finally Section III contains concluding comments.
II The Model
There are two periods t = 1; 2. We assume that each …rm and worker lives for both periods with many …rms and workers, with L the ratio of workers to …rms. We identify each …rm with an entrepreneur who owns it. In each period a representative …rm operates a decreasing returns technology producing a perishable good, with production function f (N t ; x t ) ; where N t is the current number of workers employed at the …rm, x t 2 X R + is a productivity shock observable at the start of the period, and @f =@N > 0; @ 2 f =@N 2 < 0. (Hours per worker are not variable.)
Current pro…ts are given by f (N; x) wN , where w denotes the (real) wage paid in the current period (assuming a uniform wage, which need not hold in period increases di¤erentials between existing and new employees in each job, unless the pay of existing employees is cut as well."Bewley sees the maintenance of morale to be a major factor in avoiding pay di¤erentials between new hires and incumbents. He does however …nd some evidence, in line with our hypothesis, that incumbent workers are concerned with replacement under two-tier wage systems (p. 146). A morale based theory of why new hires cannot be paid less than incumbents doing the same jobs, would have similar predictions to those we obtain here. 9 They estimate the cyclicality of hiring wages in the U.S. by using SIPP (Survey of Income and Program Participation) worker data collected at four-month intervals during 1990-1996. They regress (log) real wage on the unemployment rate, the interaction of the unemployment rate with a new hire dummy variable, match dummy variables, and other controls including the current tenure of the match. The estimated coe¢ cient of the interaction term is statistically insigni…cant, and they conclude that, "after we control for compositional e¤ects, new hire wages appear no more cyclically sensitive than existing workers'wages" (pp. 73-4). Contrasting evidence is provided in Haefke, Sonntag, and van Rens (2013) , who …nd the wage of those hired out of nonemployment to be quite sensitive to productivity changes. In our model, new hire wages are more variable than those of incumbents', but this is due to higher hiring wages in booms.
2). There is no disutility of work, and a worker who is unemployed in any period receives an income of b, so that they would prefer to work for any w > b. We assume that @f =@N (L; x) > b for all x 2 X so that in a spot market the labour market would clear at full employment; also higher values of x correspond to better output shocks: @f =@x (N; x) > 0 and @ 2 f =@N @x > 0. Each worker has a per-period utility of consumption function v (c), v 0 > 0 and v 00 < 0, where v 0 and v 00 denote …rst and second derivatives respectively. Workers cannot borrow or save, so consume all their current income; we assume for simplicity that there is no discounting of the future by workers. Entrepreneurs on the other hand are risk-neutral, but also have a zero discount rate. We assume that x = x 1 is …xed at t = 1, but at t = 2, x is a random variable, common across …rms, with …nite support. Henceforth x without a subscript will refer to the second period productivity shock.
A …rm has a wage policy w 1 ; (w 2 (x) ; w h (x)) x2X to which it commits: workers hired at t = 1 are o¤ered a wage contract (w 1 ; w 2 ) and period 2 hires are o¤ered w h . A worker who accepts a contract at t = 1 su¤ers exogenous separation from the …rm at the end of the …rst period, with probability . In the second period such unattached workers seek work. Following MM and ST, employment is assumed to be "at will", so in the second period (after observing x) the …rm can dismiss a worker without compensation, and a worker can quit without penalty. We assume that such workers remain unemployed in their second period. Hence we rule out on-the-job search, which will imply that quitting is never optimal in period 2.
Thus workers face an exogenous separation risk, and also the possibility that the …rm will dismiss them; in equilibrium we will …nd that the latter will only occur when the …rm is laying o¤ workers, but we shall see that the possibility that workers could be replaced by cheaper new hires will constrain the contract (as in MM and ST).
Simultaneously with committing to a wage policy at the start of period 1, …rms plan how many hires n t (layo¤s if n 2 is negative, where n 2
(1 ) n 1 ) to make in period t = 1; 2; n 2 depends on x.
10 (Where there is no ambiguity we suppress x in what follows to simplify notation.) We assume that workers can observe n 1 when considering whether to accept a contract from the …rm (this is only relevant for computing layo¤ probabilities). We denote the representative …rm's period t workforce by N t , so N 1 n 1 and N 2 (1 ) n 1 + n 2 . We denote its wageemployment policy by := w 1 ; (w 2 (x) ; w h (x)) x2X ; n 1 ; (n 2 (x)) x2X .
Let Z 2 (x) be the utility of a worker in period 2 looking for work in state x. The value to a worker at t = 1 from being employed by a …rm with policy then is
if the worker only faces a separation risk, where E x denotes expectation with respect to the distribution of states x. On the other hand, if layo¤s or replacement occur in some states, then in such states the …nal term inside the square brackets must be averaged with (1 ) v (b) using the probability of this happening.
Markets are assumed to be competitive. The period 1 labour market clears but the period 2 market may not. We denote the equilibrium supply price of period 2 labour by w s , that is any …rm o¤ering at least this amount can hire as much as it wants, otherwise it cannot hire at all. We look for a symmetric equilibrium and use a hat to denote equilibrium values of …rms'choices. We de…ne
where to allow for layo¤s we de…ne b n 2 := max fn 2 ; 0g, so b n 2 = ( L) is the proportion of workers exogenously separated after period 1 who …nd work (recall that other separated workers remain unemployed). That is, if the labour market clears then w s =ŵ h (i.e., the common hiring wage o¤ered in a symmetric equilibrium) and
As mentioned above, at t = 2 the …rm can, by at will contracting, choose whether to replace its incumbents or not. If w h w 2 …rms will have no incentive to do this, but for w s w h < w 2 the …rm will replace its incumbent workforce. If w h = w 2 then the …rm is indi¤erent, and we assume that replacement does not occur. In our framework, however, it is always weakly ex ante optimal to avoid replacement. In period 1 workers would anticipate replacement in period 2, and given they receive b in that case, they would weakly prefer to receive w h as w h w s b. So the …rm 11 Excess demand in the labor market cannot arise in this competitive model as a very small increase in w h would allow an individual …rm to hire as much as it wishes; such a deviation would always be pro…table.
12 While this seems the natural assumption, results are not sensitive to this precise formulation.
could reduce w 2 to w h , which would not reduce the ex ante value of the contract V 1 ( ; Z 2 ) in (1), and the …rm would still be able to hire at w h , so its pro…ts cannot be reduced by this change. Given that wages are committed to ex ante, by setting w h w 2 in state x a …rm e¤ectively commits to not replace its incumbents, and we refer to this inequality as the no replacement constraint. We henceforth impose this constraint on the …rm.
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If there are no layo¤s in period 2 (n 2 (x) 0 for all x), a …rm's pro…t is:
Otherwise, in any state where layo¤s occur, in the expression for second period pro…t wage costs are replaced by w 2 ((1 )n 1 + n 2 ). The …rm solves
for all x, and, if n 2 (x) > 0;
while if n 2 (x) 0,
Here, (4) requires that the …rm o¤ers to period 1 hires at least what they can get elsewhere, (5) is the no replacement constraint, (6) requires that if the …rm intends to hire in period 2 , it must o¤er at least the supply price of labour, while (7) requires that if there are layo¤s that n 2 must be optimal given w 2 (ex post optimality is satis…ed when n 2 > 0 and so does not need to be imposed as mentioned in Footnote 14). We de…ne an equilibrium as follows:
De…nition 1 A (symmetric) equilibrium consists of a wage-employment policy^ which solves Problem A, and such that n 1 = L and n 2 L, and where Z 2 (x) is given by (2) for all x, and
Positive Hiring
For the moment we shall ignore layo¤s and consider a state x with n 2 > 0. This is appropriate provided that the period 2 shock x is not too bad and the rate of exogenous separation is su¢ ciently high. The explicit restrictions that imply n 2 > 0 will be established later.
Anticipating future results, aggregate period 2 labour demand N 2 will be (f 0 ) 1 (w h ) (we suppress x) where f 0 @f =@N (N; x), i.e., will be on the standard labour demand curve, and we denote by w spot (x) the wage that would clear the market in state x, i.e., w spot (x) := @f =@N (L; x) > b. 15 Consequently either w h = w spot and the labour market clears, in which case w s = w spot , or w h > w spot , the labour market fails to clear, in which case w s = b < w spot . We cannot have w h < w spot as that would imply excess demand for labour, and as mentioned earlier, this cannot arise (see Footnote 11).
We proceed heuristically (see the Appendix for formal proofs).
In period 2 in any state x, given n 1 and w 1 , following MM it can be shown that the …rm must locally maximize ex post period 2 pro…ts plus weighted incumbent utility. In particular, given it is optimal not to replace, and recall we are provisionally assuming that the shock is such that labour demand exceeds (1 )n 1 (so that period 1 hires only face the exogenous separation risk), it must maximizê
15 @f =@n (L; x) > b by an earlier assumption. The intuition is clear: given the …rm wants to hire and has committed to w h , it will always hire up to the point where the marginal product of labor equals this wage. This is true whether or not the wage is against the no replacement constraint. As already remarked, in this case it does not matter that the …rm cannot commit to period 2 employment as the utility of period 1 hires does not depend on n 2 . (With layo¤s the lack of commitment will a¤ect the solution.) 9 with respect to n 2 ; w h ; w 2 ; w h w 2 subject to w h w s h . The last term in (9) includes the continuation utility of an incumbent, taking into account the separation possibility, and multiplied by the number of period 1 hires. The intuition here is that any change which a¤ects the utility of the …rm's old workers can be o¤set by a change in the …rst period wage, leaving V 1 unchanged (and hence n 1 ). Multiplying the utility change through by the inverse of …rst period marginal utility then converts it (for a small change) to the …rst period wage saving per worker. If this was not satis…ed then pro…ts can be increased.
There are three cases to consider:
(A) The "no replacement constraint" w h w 2 is slack in state x. Given that @^ =@w h < 0 and w h > w 2 , it would pay to cut w h whenever w h > w s , and so w h = w s . Then di¤erentiating (9) with respect to w 2 yields the FOC:
so that w 1 = w 2 (< w h ). Intuitively the …rm should stabilize the wages of the …rst period hires if there is no cost to doing this. In this case, also di¤erentiating with respect to n 2 , we get
where recall that N 2 (1 )n 1 + n 2 , and as w h = w s we get that w h = w spot (and there is full employment).
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Intuitively, labour demand in period 2 is su¢ ciently high that there is full employment and to hire …rms must pay a wage above w 1 . Then there is no reason not to o¤er incumbents a constant wage, w 2 = w 1 , as this doesn't violate the no replacement constraint.
(B) Both w h w 2 and w h w s are binding at the optimum. So w h = w 2 = w s ;
and (11) holds, and hence there is full employment (w h = w s implies this). It must be that w s w 1 since otherwise from (10) cutting w 2 would increase^ without violating any constraints.
Intuitively this is an intermediate case, still with full employment, but now the spot wage is somewhat below w 1 ; and …rms o¤er a new hire wage equal to the spot wage. To avoid violating the no replacement constraint incumbents are paid the 16 Recall f 0 (L) =: w spot , and w s > w spot is impossible from (8), while w h = w s < w spot implies, from (11), N 2 > L; which is also impossible.
same, i.e., less than w 1 , so wage smoothing is not perfect, but …rms want to avail themselves of the opportunity to employ new hires at a wage below w 1 .
(C) If on the other hand w h w 2 is binding at the optimum but w h > w s , then setting w 2 = w h and di¤erentiating (9) with respect to w h :
Di¤erentiating with respect to n 2 we get (11) again (consequently as noted earlier, period 2 employment is always on the labour demand function when n 2 > 0). Substitute for N 2 from (11) in (12), recalling that N 2 = (1 )n 1 + n 2 :
The …rst term in the de…nition of g captures the e¤ect of raising period 2 incumbent wages by a small amount on reducing the period 1 wage bill; the second term is the aggregate period 2 labour demand, and so is the extra period 2 wage bill given that the new hire wage also rises by the same amount as the incumbent wage to avoid violating the no replacement constraint. If, say, g > 0, holding employment constant while increasing period 2 wages would lead to an overall lower wage bill, and vice versa if g < 0. Solving g (w h ; n 1 ; w 1 ; x) = 0 yields w h (= w 2 ) = w d h (n 1 ; w 1 ; x) := g 1 (0; n 1 ; w 1 ; x).
Intuitively, the spot wage is su¢ ciently low that …rms do not want to cut wages that far. That is, because w h w s is not binding, wages can be cut, but there is a trade-o¤: cutting w h obviously reduces the wages that must be paid to period 2 hires, but there is a cost imposed on period 1 hires who will also have their period 2 wages cut to avoid violating the no-replacement constraint, and thus must receive compensation for this variability in their wage pro…le. At w d these two e¤ects just balance, and …rms do not want to cut wages further, even though they could hire at a lower wage. This implies the wage exhibits downward rigidity (the value of w s per se has no e¤ect on it) and there is (involuntary) unemployment.
Assumption 1 We assume henceforth @g(w d ; L; w 1 ; x)=@w h < 0.
This follows provided workers are su¢ ciently risk-averse. It guarantees that w d is unique.
In equilibrium n 1 = L, and we de…ne a critical value w for the wage w h which solves (13) but where the labour demand term
i.e.,
In the proposition it is shown that Case C occurs when the spot wage is below w, and Case B when the spot wage lies between w and w 1 . It also strengthens the forgoing discussion (proof in the Appendix).
Proposition 1 Suppose, in an equilibrium, hiring is positive in state x at period 2. If in this state w spot ŵ 1 thenŵ h = w spot ,ŵ 2 =ŵ 1 and there is full employment, Thus, givenŵ 1 , in any state for which labour demand is high enough that the spot wage w spot would exceedŵ 1 , new hire wages will be at the spot wage and the incumbents' wages are perfectly smoothed:ŵ 2 =ŵ 1 ; there will be full employment. 17 This is how a policy would look even if the …rm could commit to not replace incumbents and could therefore undercut their wages; in these states the replacement problem does not matter. For a somewhat lower spot wage, the new hire wage will equal the incumbent wage and be at the spot wage. The costs of reducing the incumbent's wage belowŵ 1 is second-order when w s is close toŵ 1 , whereas the cost of setting the new hire wage w h above the supply price w s is …rst-order, so given the constraint w h w 2 , w h = w 2 = w spot is optimal.
However, for low enough labour demand, w spot < w; as explained above, the costs of reducing wage smoothing further would more than o¤set the gain from 17 If such a state was anticipated with a su¢ ciently high probability, then it might appear that a worker who quit at the same time as the exogenous separations occur could be better o¤ as they would receive a higher period 2 wage. While we have ruled this out by assumption, it could be justi…ed by supposing there is a high enough mobility cost incurred by the worker. Going to the other extreme and allowing full ex post mobility of labour, as in Snell and Thomas (2010) , would eliminate region A as it would impose an extra constraint, w h w 2 (so that w h = w 2 always). We conjecture however that the other qualitative results would still hold.
cheaper new hires, and w h (= w 2 ) is set above w spot and there is unemployment.
Moreover the wage is above w. The intuition is straightforward: as hiring is lower than would be the case at full employment, the gain from a lower wage in terms of cheaper new hires becomes smaller relative to the desire to stabilize wages, which is una¤ected, resulting in a higher wage.
This intuition suggests that in region C the wage increases as the productivity shock worsens, as again at lower employment levels the gain from a lower wage is diminished given that a smaller number of new hires is being made. This is con…rmed in the next proposition (proof in the Appendix):
Proposition 2 For any two states at date 2, x; x 0 with x < x 0 , and such that for both states hiring is positive and w spot < w; (i.e., we are in case
A …nal general result when there is positive hiring at date 2 in all states is that w 1 is no lower than the marginal product of labour in period 1.
Proposition 3 Suppose in an equilibrium, hiring is positive in each state x at period 2. Then @f (n 1 ; x 1 ) =@N ŵ 1 . This is strict wheneverŵ h >ŵ 2 in at least one state at date 2.
The intuition is that in bad states of the world the no replacement constraint binds and so w h = w 2 ; there is no bene…t or cost to carrying an extra worker into period 2 as one new hire less or more can be made at the same wage. In good states when w h > w 2 , however, there is a bene…t in having an extra incumbent worker given that they will receive a lower wage than new hires. It follows that the value to hiring an extra worker in period 1 may be greater than their period 1 product, and the wage may not be allocative.
Example 4 Assume each …rm has technology given by, at time t = 1; 2 :
where x 1 > 0; x 2 = x > 0; and recall x 1 is …xed. Assume also that workers have perperiod utility functions of the constant relative risk aversion family with coe¢ cient > 1, described by v(c) = c 1 =(1 ); with v 0 (c) = c . In this case then
In this example in Case C we have w spot < w; w h = w 2 = w d and N 2 < L. We can write (13) for n 1 = L as
and solving for w h we get
Moreover, Assumption 1 is satis…ed, given > 1.
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No hiring
For a bad enough shock in period 2; the …rm may prefer not to hire. This occurs, from Proposition 1, if labour demand at w h =ŵ 1 is no greater than (1 ) L.
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Suppose that x = x is such that we are just on the limit of the positive hiring regime, that is, from when labour demand at w h =ŵ 1 equals (1 ) L.
Proposition 5 There exists an interval of values for x, [x; x ] with x < x , such thatn 2 (x) = 0 for any x 2 [x; x ].
At x we have w d =ŵ 1 . Then for x 2 [x; x ] there is neither hiring nor …ring, so that as x falls, the wage falls fromŵ 1 to maintain labour demand at (1 ) L.
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Over this range we observe 'labour hoarding' in the sense that worse states do not lead to layo¤s (although employment remains below the …rst-best level). The intuition is as follows. At x ,ŵ 2 =ŵ 1 andn 2 = 0. For x slightly below x ; if the …rm maintained w 2 =ŵ 1 then there would be layo¤s, n 2 < 0. However the 18 After manipulation we get @g(
19 In the example, this is when x=ŵ 1 (1 ) L: 20 Given we are analysing a …nite set of states, this proposition might be empty if X \ [x; x ] is itself empty. In a continuous state version of the model, however, the same result would hold and su¢ ciently adverse shocks would imply that this region occurs with positive probability. Moreover, [x; x ] depends only onŵ 1 , not on X, and provided there are uniform bounds on X; we can show that for su¢ ciently dense X a similar conclusion applies in the …nite state case.
…rm would su¤er only a second order loss were it to increase employment (reduce layo¤s from this point); however incumbents would get a …rst-order bene…t as their lay-o¤ probability falls (their utility falls when laid-o¤ as w 2 > b). The …rm cannot commit to do this, but it can reduce the wage slightly fromŵ 1 to achieve the same employment outcome; this also only has a second-order cost for wage smoothing. Thus the …rm can strictly increase pro…ts by holding n 2 = 0 in this way. Only when productivity falls su¢ ciently below x , and w 2 is much lower thanŵ 1 so the wage smoothing costs of further wage cuts become too large, will the …rm start laying o¤ its workforce.
When layo¤s occur, the same logic implies thatŵ 2 <ŵ 1 : if to the contrarŷ w 2 =ŵ 1 then a small cut in the wage would increase pro…ts by diminishing the lay-o¤ rate.
There is some evidence that, consistent with this range, during the great recession in the U.K. substantial wage cuts went alongside the unusually small reductions in employment given the path of output. (Crawford, Jin, and Simpson 2013) argue that the evidence is consistent with labour hoarding, particularly by smaller and medium sized …rms.
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Numerical example
To illustrate the solution, in the example suppose that L = 1;ŵ 1 = 1, the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion = 2, = 0:2; b = 0:6. The value for is plausible on an annual basis, given that it e¤ectively excludes quits due to on the job search and layo¤s. The value for b gives a replacement ratio of 60% relative to period 1 wages: The solution for period 2 wages as a function of possible values for x is illustrated in Figure 1 . Here the spot wage equals x. Starting from the top, when x > 1 we are in case A, and the spot wage exceedsŵ 1 soŵ h = x >ŵ 2 = 1. In case B the spot wage belowŵ 1 reduces bothŵ h andŵ 2 as the no replacement constraint bites. For values of x below w = 0:894, optimal wages are above the spot wage and there is involuntary unemployment. The gap between the wage and the (dotted) spot wage line determines the amount of unemployment, given that the spot wage line shows 21 Of course in our model employment is also constant at full employment. However, in a model with an upward sloping labour supply curve this would not be the case, while the 'labor hoarding' region we have identi…ed would still imply employment that is unrepsonsive to a range of productivity shocks. The point is that in the latter case, we are "o¤ the labor suply curve". the level of wages needed for full employment. As explained earlier, wages rise as x falls in case C. Thus unemployment rises as x falls in this region. For still lower values of x; we have a range of (employment) inactivity, where wages fall sharply enough to just maintain employment of all incumbents; equivalently unemployment is constant. Finally layo¤s occur, and we …nd that wages are constant as x falls further so in this range negative shocks feed directly in to increases in layo¤s and further increases in unemployment.
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We stress three points: …rst, the period 2 wage is allocative in all regions, and whenever it lies above the spot wage line (the 45 degree line), unemployment exists and is involuntary, and employment is ine¢ ciently low; employment is excessively sensitive to productivity shocks in case C and when n 2 < 0; this is trivial here as employment is constant at L in the …rst best allocation. Second, and related, is that not only is there ine¢ ciently low hiring over some range where hiring is positive (i.e., in case C), but also employment is ine¢ ciently low over the whole range where n 2 = 0 and where layo¤s occur (recall that provided x > b = 0:6, the …rst-best allocation would have full employment). Thirdly, even when n 2 0, the no-replacement constraint matters because it prevents …rms from bringing new hires 22 Solving (25) in at a lower wage.
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In Figure 2 , risk aversion is higher ( = 4) and the rate of separation is somewhat higher, at 30% ( = 0:3). While is high for measured risk aversion, estimated elasticities of intertemporal consumption (the inverse of ) are frequently very low (e.g., Hall (1988) ). In this case wages fall less far before case C occurs; intuitively the higher risk aversion means that the incentive to stabilize wages overrides the bene…t of cheaper new hire wages when the spot wage is closer to w 1 .
There is little empirical work that breaks down the response of real wages to di¤erent parts of the cycle. One recent exception is Snell and Stüber (2013) who analyze wages from the IAB Employee History File (BEH) -a comprehensive Social Security based administrative dataset for Germany. Controlling for match quality (see for example Hagedorn and Manovskii (2013) ) at a detailed level (worker-…rm-occupation) they extract year e¤ects from a panel regression of real wages on match dummies and other controls for the years 1977-2008. They …nd a strong asymmetry in the response of these real wage year e¤ects to the aggregate unemployment rate; when unemployment is below its long run mean the response is around 0:25 and insigni…cant whilst when unemployment is above its long run mean the response is strongly signi…cant at 1:84. Strong upward movements of wages in upswings with rigidity in downswings is reasonably consistent with the predictions of our model. In a further analysis they …nd the incremental cyclical response for new hires and for low tenure workers, respectively, are both insigni…cant-in fact these incremental year e¤ects are virtually white noise. This second …nding lends some support to our theoretical prediction that new hire wages do not undercut those of incumbents in downswings.
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III Concluding Comments
It has been argued that the assumption that …rms cannot commit not to replace has major implications for the nature of employment contracts. Not only does this lead to …rms choosing not to pay new hires less than ongoing employees, but it also implies that real wages have a substantial degree of downward rigidity. This implies excessive sensitivity of employment to shocks. Nevertheless the relationship is highly nonlinear. At the point where new hiring falls to zero, and for a range of worse shocks, it is optimal to o¤er incumbents (i.e., those who were not exogenously separated from the previous period) job security and cut wages to preserve employment. We term this labour hoarding. For shocks such that layo¤s occur, though, wages remain rigid, and again employment is excessively sensitive to shocks.
In future work we aim to test the more nuanced relationship between shocks and wages/employment that the model predicts. Further theoretical extensions that are desirable include considering asymmetric shocks, frictional labour markets, and a multi-period model with the same characteristics. IV Appendix:
Proof of Proposition 1
We derive necessary conditions for the …rm by considering the following Lagrangian for Problem A, assuming for ease of presentation an interior solution with
where ; x ; x 0. This leads to the FOCs:
and
Clearly > 0: (a) 26 Suppose that x = 0 and x > 0. From (16) and (19),
and consequently
(c) Suppose that x > 0 and x = 0: Then, using (16), (18), (20), and w h = w 2 in (19):
which yields (13) in the text. And from (21),
Next, consider equilibrium. From (20), period 2 total labour demand N 2 (x) is on the usual labour demand (marginal productivity) curve, so that if
implies case (I).
Consider now the three possibilities addressed in the proposition. First suppose that in equilibrium, in state x, w spot (x) ŵ 1 . Case (b) impliesŵ 1 >ŵ 2 (x) = w h (x) = w s (x), which from the above paragraph implies (II), soŵ h (x) = w spot (x), but then we getŵ h (x) = w spot (x) ŵ 1 >ŵ h (x), a contradiction. Likewise, case (c) implies eitherŵ 1 >ŵ 2 (x) =ŵ h (x) = w s (x), so the same argument implies a contradiction, orŵ 1 >ŵ 2 (x) =ŵ h (x) > w s (x), so case (I), and w
, a contradiction. We conclude that only case (a) is compatible.
Next suppose that w spot (x) <ŵ 1 . This is incompatible with case (a) since the latter implies thatŵ h (x) = w s (x) ŵ 2 (x) =ŵ 1 , and so case (II), w s (x) =ŵ h (x) = w spot (x); another contradiction.
If w < w spot (x) <ŵ 1 , then at w h = w; as, by w < w spot (x), (f 0 ) 1 (w) > L; we have g (w; L;ŵ 1 ; x) < 0 in view of (13) and (14). By Assumption 1, w d h (L;ŵ 1 ; x) < w; so if we are in case (c), then we would haveŵ
which is impossible; so we are in Case (b).
Finally if w spot (x) w: then at w h = w; as, by
and comparing (13) and (14), we have g (w; L;ŵ 1 ; x) 0. Suppose we are in case (b), which recall implies case (II), and soŵ h (x) = w spot (x) w. By Assumption 1, g (ŵ h (x) ; L;ŵ 1 ; x) 0 (since otherwise there would exist a solution to (13) with @g(w d ; n 1 ; w 1 ; x)=@w h > 0), i.e.,
Using (16), (18), (20), andŵ h =ŵ 2 in (19),
which contradicts (22) as x > 0 in case (b). So we are in case (c) andŵ
so in view of (13) and (14) we have g (w; L;ŵ 1 ; x) = 0:
we have g (w; L;ŵ 1 ; x) > 0; using the argument above (22). By Assumption 1 and continuity of g, a solution to g (w h ; L;ŵ 1 ; x) = 0 must then have w h = w d > w.
To prove the …nal claim of the proposition, consider the case w spot (x) < w (other cases are straightforward). Note that (f 0 ) 1 (ŵ 1 ) > (1 ) L implies that at w h =ŵ 1 ; g (ŵ 1 ; L;ŵ 1 ; x) = (1 ) L (f 0 ) 1 (ŵ 1 ) < 0. Given that g (w; L;ŵ 1 ; x) > 0, then by continuity a solution for g (w h ; L;ŵ 1 ; x) = 0 exists between w andŵ 1 ; and so at w d , total labour demand (f 0 ) 1 (w d ) > (1 ) L and hiring is positive. Conversely, suppose that (f 0 ) 1 (ŵ 1 ) (1 ) L. Then g (ŵ 1 ; L;ŵ 1 ; x) = (1 ) L (f 0 ) 1 (ŵ 1 ) _ 0. Given Assumption 1, no solution exists between w andŵ 1 , contradicting the solution for the case w spot (x) < w. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
Totally di¤erentiating (13) with n 1 set equal to L and noting that w 1 will be constant, yields dw
By Assumption 1, @g(w d ; n 1 ; w 1 ; x)=@w h = (1 )(v 0 (w 1 )) 1 v 00 w d (@ 2 f =@N 2 ) 1 < 0: Given that @ 2 f =@N @x > 0 and @ 2 f =@N 2 < 0; it follows straightforwardly that dw d =dx < 0; which establishes the claim of the proposition. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
We see that E [(1 )f 0 (N 2 ) w 2 (1 )] 0 given that f 0 (N 2 ) = w h from (20) and w h w 2 from the no replacement constraint. Thus from (17) @f (n 1 ; x 1 ) =@N w 1 . This is strict whenever w h > w 2 in at least one state. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5
For states with n 2 0 the relevant terms inside the expectation operator in the Lagrangian in the proof of Proposition 1 are replaced by
and x = x = 0. Note that w h no longer appears, we have added a constraint that n 2 0 with multiplier x 0, and we have substituted N 2 = (f 0 ) 1 (w 2 ) from (7) (i.e., to re ‡ect the at-will employment assumption implies that the …rm cannot commit to n 2 but must choose optimally given w 2 ). In the expression for expected worker utility, 1 (f 0 ) 1 (w 2 )=n 1 is the probability of layo¤ while (f 0 ) 1 (w 2 )=n 1 is the probability of being retained. We get the FOC
We are in equilibrium, so n 1 = L. From (16) = L=v 0 (w 1 ) ; and noting that f 0 (N 2 ) w 2 = 0, (23) can be rewritten as:
For (24) to have a solution with x = 0, we must have
At x , there are neither layo¤s nor new hires: n 2 = 0, i.e., N 2 = L, and w 2 = w 1 . Consider x < x : By the last claim in Proposition 1, n 2 0. It cannot be that w 2 w 1 , as this implies that (v 0 (w 2 ) =v 0 (w 1 ) 1) 0 and since d (f 0 ) 1 (w 2 )=dw 2 < 0 we have from (24),
and given that v (b) < v (ŵ 1 ) v (w 2 ) ; x > 0 (so N 2 = L), but N 2 = (f 0 ) 1 (w 2 ) < L by @ 2 f =@N @x > 0, a contradiction.
Next, consider a sequence such that x r ! x from below; if there are solutions to the FOCs with x = 0 at each x r then there exist solutions w r 2 w 1 to (25) for each x r satisfying
in this case w r 2 ! w 1 (otherwise-along a subsequence-lim w r 2 < w 1 and so lim (f 0 ) 1 (w r 2 )) > (1 ) L, and thus (26) is eventually violated along the sequence). By continuity of all the functions in (25) in x and w 2 , the L.H.S. converges to zero, the R.H.S. to a positive number, so (25) is eventually violated along the sequence, a contradiction. Hence no such sequence exists, and so there exists an interval of values for x, (x; x ) say, such that for x 2 (x; x ) ; x > 0, and the claim of the proposition follows (for a closed interval, as x > 0 at x ). Q.E.D.
